You must take this product. You cannot sue if injured. You can maybe see the clinical trial safety data in 75+ years. And the deidentified post-licensure safety data – no, you cannot see that either.
Thank you, Aaron, for your dogged determination and fortitude. Keep chipping away. Their refusal to divulge anything can only mean that there is damning evidence that they don't want anyone to see.
WHOA. Now I’m dying to see how the v-safe data compares with VAERS data. We’ve long needed a superior AE tracking system to address the deficiencies in VAERS.
That said, if those of us who have been researching this for almost two years haven’t heard of it, how many of the vaxx-injured/bereaved know v-safe exists and are using it?
Pfizer has more power than all world governments. Corporations have gone from a good idea to one that's beyond abused. If we replace corporations with individuals with liability, all this would end.
Thank you for doing this on behalf of those of us not in the position to do it for ourselves. I pray daily for you and other journalists I read on SubStack that you will be successful in all your endeavors to protect our freedoms.
I would love to see how the V safe app system operates. I hope the reporting criteria is not the same as was used to report adverse events in the trials. Judging by the CDC’s unwillingness to provide the V Safe data I’m going to assume it’s not. Seems like they have something to hide.
Aaron, I think you're being given the runaround by means of confusing technical language. I'm a database engineer who's dealt with the (European) GDPR among others things. I strongly urge you to consult a data/data privacy specialist to help you with this suit.
"Meaning, in the form that the CDC made the data available to Oracle. "
I suspect that the technical reality underlying this is that the data actually held by Oracle is either
a) NOT deidentified; or
b) only pseudonymised.
"Pseudonymised" means that a true identifying attribute (e.g. SS number) is replaced with a random number, which however does map 1-1 with the real identifier. The 1-1 mapping is necessary because it's valuable to know that the _same_ person reported e.g. 6 adverse events, even without knowing _who_ that person is. The "key", the mapping table, is obviously the No.1 security asset in that scenario.
The key here is the word "aggregate". If you aggregate data enough, to produce totals or a graph, it almost entirely de-identifies itself: all you see is the number "200" - meaning for example "cases of X in males 20-30 in [location]". There are limits to this deidentification, especially if the data is pseudonymised but "enriched" with additional (e.g. demographic) information. This enrichment provides more flexibility and value to reporting, but means that - with interactive OLAP reporting tools which are commonplace - you can quite easily drill down to individuals, e.g. by intersecting "males in [sparsely populated county in North Dakota]" with "[pre-existing very rare medical condition]". It's then theoretically possible to map the resulting 1 pseudonymous person to a real person. (How theoretical that is depends on how private _other_ databases - e.g. medical/demographic ones - are).
Because of this, there is a good privacy argument (whether it's enshrined in law e.g. GDPR, I don't know) to limit _interactive_ access to aggregate reports. By interactive, I mean giving you the tools to produce whatever reports you want. You might produce a very specific report which destroys the deidentification produced by aggregation. On the other hand, this argument doesn't apply to asking for and receiving "innocuous", non-privacy-threatening reports from Oracle.
But this limits your access to the data. And who decides whether a report is "privacy-threatening", so that you can't see it? It's a very grey area. Having worked in tech for decades, I'm pretty sure that a tech company would err on the side of covering their ass in every case.
Where is the dividing line between the non-anonymised and anonymised data?
Here's a scenario which I think is unlikely:
CDC have their _own_ database, with identifying data. They anonymise (or pseudonymise) it and copy it to Oracle. This is unlikely, because what is Oracle's role in this scenario? Merely providing a duplicate database. Why hold your own database in-house and then contract a (n expensive) DB provider to duplicate it?
Far more likely:
The database side is wholly outsourced to Oracle. Oracle hold both identifiable and pseudonymised data. When Oracle (or CDC) claims that Oracle only has access to anonymised data, that just means that there are strong security protocols protecting the identifiable data. For example, I, as a database administrator, could definitely access at least individual-level pseudonymised data (how would I track down bugs otherwise?) - but I have a complex password, 2FA, and I've signed an NDA/a GDPR agreement.
Possibly, CDC staff can also access this individual-level data, with similar security safeguards.
The "anonymisation" is no such thing: merely the effect of aggregation. So I think that by asking for the truly anonymised, leaf-level data, you may be asking for something which doesn't exist.
A better solution might be to ask for _pseudonymised_ leaf-level data, on a "good faith/research" basis. What I mean is, that the data would have to be stored securely, would have to be accessed only by people conducting research who've signed agreements to safeguard privacy (to guard against the "de-aggregation effect" I described above).
Given the _political_ aspects of this case, that's a request that's unlikely to be granted without a fight. But it _has_ been granted before (sorry, I'm a tech specialist, not a specialist in privacy/data law).
My main point: don't let CDC/Oracle's magic technical words confuse you or lead you down the wrong track.
The FDA Wants to Hide Pre-Licensure Data Until You’re Dead and Now the CDC Wants to Hide the Post-Licensure Safety Data
Thank you, Aaron, for your dogged determination and fortitude. Keep chipping away. Their refusal to divulge anything can only mean that there is damning evidence that they don't want anyone to see.
WHOA. Now I’m dying to see how the v-safe data compares with VAERS data. We’ve long needed a superior AE tracking system to address the deficiencies in VAERS.
That said, if those of us who have been researching this for almost two years haven’t heard of it, how many of the vaxx-injured/bereaved know v-safe exists and are using it?
Go get ’em, Aaron!! 👏🙏💪
Pfizer has more power than all world governments. Corporations have gone from a good idea to one that's beyond abused. If we replace corporations with individuals with liability, all this would end.
You should team up with Judicial Watch. They have an excellent track record of getting their FOIA requests granted through aggressive lawsuits.
Time for us peasants to pull out the pitchforks.
Thank you for doing this on behalf of those of us not in the position to do it for ourselves. I pray daily for you and other journalists I read on SubStack that you will be successful in all your endeavors to protect our freedoms.
God be with you Aaron Siri and team.
Thank you. God bless you.
I don't go for petitions, but we should list specific names,
Lemmon. DeBlasio, Newsome andrews
and job categories (Twitter fact checker) that should be put on trial for crimes against humanity.
I have seen posts of local news stations asking about how people died from covid. Instead anguished and furious stories of vaccine deaths...
How could they not know people want them hung?
Let's tell them... I predict in USA alone....
20 million would sign it...
Australia. 85% of adults
Bless you!
I would love to see how the V safe app system operates. I hope the reporting criteria is not the same as was used to report adverse events in the trials. Judging by the CDC’s unwillingness to provide the V Safe data I’m going to assume it’s not. Seems like they have something to hide.
Thank you for pursuing this. I want to say that this lack of transparency is unbelievable. Sadly, it’s all too believable.
Clearly they’re hiding something really, really bad. We need to know what it is.
These corporate entities and the people who direct them are crooks.
Crooks need to hide their crimes.
Aaron, I think you're being given the runaround by means of confusing technical language. I'm a database engineer who's dealt with the (European) GDPR among others things. I strongly urge you to consult a data/data privacy specialist to help you with this suit.
"Meaning, in the form that the CDC made the data available to Oracle. "
I suspect that the technical reality underlying this is that the data actually held by Oracle is either
a) NOT deidentified; or
b) only pseudonymised.
"Pseudonymised" means that a true identifying attribute (e.g. SS number) is replaced with a random number, which however does map 1-1 with the real identifier. The 1-1 mapping is necessary because it's valuable to know that the _same_ person reported e.g. 6 adverse events, even without knowing _who_ that person is. The "key", the mapping table, is obviously the No.1 security asset in that scenario.
The key here is the word "aggregate". If you aggregate data enough, to produce totals or a graph, it almost entirely de-identifies itself: all you see is the number "200" - meaning for example "cases of X in males 20-30 in [location]". There are limits to this deidentification, especially if the data is pseudonymised but "enriched" with additional (e.g. demographic) information. This enrichment provides more flexibility and value to reporting, but means that - with interactive OLAP reporting tools which are commonplace - you can quite easily drill down to individuals, e.g. by intersecting "males in [sparsely populated county in North Dakota]" with "[pre-existing very rare medical condition]". It's then theoretically possible to map the resulting 1 pseudonymous person to a real person. (How theoretical that is depends on how private _other_ databases - e.g. medical/demographic ones - are).
Because of this, there is a good privacy argument (whether it's enshrined in law e.g. GDPR, I don't know) to limit _interactive_ access to aggregate reports. By interactive, I mean giving you the tools to produce whatever reports you want. You might produce a very specific report which destroys the deidentification produced by aggregation. On the other hand, this argument doesn't apply to asking for and receiving "innocuous", non-privacy-threatening reports from Oracle.
But this limits your access to the data. And who decides whether a report is "privacy-threatening", so that you can't see it? It's a very grey area. Having worked in tech for decades, I'm pretty sure that a tech company would err on the side of covering their ass in every case.
Where is the dividing line between the non-anonymised and anonymised data?
Here's a scenario which I think is unlikely:
CDC have their _own_ database, with identifying data. They anonymise (or pseudonymise) it and copy it to Oracle. This is unlikely, because what is Oracle's role in this scenario? Merely providing a duplicate database. Why hold your own database in-house and then contract a (n expensive) DB provider to duplicate it?
Far more likely:
The database side is wholly outsourced to Oracle. Oracle hold both identifiable and pseudonymised data. When Oracle (or CDC) claims that Oracle only has access to anonymised data, that just means that there are strong security protocols protecting the identifiable data. For example, I, as a database administrator, could definitely access at least individual-level pseudonymised data (how would I track down bugs otherwise?) - but I have a complex password, 2FA, and I've signed an NDA/a GDPR agreement.
Possibly, CDC staff can also access this individual-level data, with similar security safeguards.
The "anonymisation" is no such thing: merely the effect of aggregation. So I think that by asking for the truly anonymised, leaf-level data, you may be asking for something which doesn't exist.
A better solution might be to ask for _pseudonymised_ leaf-level data, on a "good faith/research" basis. What I mean is, that the data would have to be stored securely, would have to be accessed only by people conducting research who've signed agreements to safeguard privacy (to guard against the "de-aggregation effect" I described above).
Given the _political_ aspects of this case, that's a request that's unlikely to be granted without a fight. But it _has_ been granted before (sorry, I'm a tech specialist, not a specialist in privacy/data law).
My main point: don't let CDC/Oracle's magic technical words confuse you or lead you down the wrong track.
They say VAERS is unreliable?
How V-safe is reliable? I’ve never heard about V-safe app. Asked my friends who got the shot, they also never heard about this app.
Aaron, thank you for doing this for all of us.
Keep up The Fight Aaron